I find this veryinteresting. It is clear that thepolitical elite were way too small to find a way to easily transform itselfinto an acceptable alternative. Worseits only tool to retain command and control is the use of repression and thatis both convincingly countered and also eliminated through the dispersion ofthe secret police.
The obvious solution as applied elsewhere is to organize the local demos as a first level of democratic regeneration to produce a fresh cadre of leaders. This cadre can then produce a parliament to legislatechange and implement economic change.
Outsiders forget that thepopulation is 100,000,000 and that means that no particular ethnic group hastrue power. Thus we are going to see a rationalization of the polity that is truly inclusive. This may sound optimistic, but I am now discerning trends not clearbefore. The radicals have already beenbeaten back into their holes by this demos.
The only way out is for an astuteleader to arise who knows how to be inclusive. Thus, history demands he will arise or be so transformed.
In strategic terms, the Arab Spring is shaping up as a massive defeat for Islamism and a stunning victory for
This may seem far fetched, but I nolonger think it is impossible. Recallthat
Why
Saturday, 09 February 2013 11:36By Carl Finamore
http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/14449-why-egypts-revolution-is-so-different
Entering the third year of the revolt in
“We are not always coming together in protests,” 28-year old unemployedaccountant, Saber, told me as he arrived for a demonstration in
As Saber explains, political sympathy among the population cannot always bemeasured in the size of the recurring protests. But for sure, the rebellionremains alive.
When Hosni Mubarak’s dictatorship fell on Feb. 11, 2011, the decayed statestructures collapsed along with him. Social and political institutions runningMubarak’s regime were in complete shatters. His regime was exposed as a verythin layer of corrupt officials and family friends.
His political party was outlawed, his parliament dissolved, his cabinetdisbanded, local municipal councils in disarray and his secret policedispersed. Significantly, Mubarak’s national labor federation, alreadythoroughly discredited, had its national leadership temporarily dismissed aswell.
All these steps occurred under pressure of the mass revolt.
This sweeping disintegration was unique to
The authentic voice of the Egyptian people was heard without filters and thisform of direct action politics put unprecedented pressure on authorities toenact meaningful reforms.
The 500,000-strong army was the only Mubarak institution left standing. It wasalso quite unscathed because it had historically avoided conflicts with thepopulation, leaving that abhorrent chore to the despised Ministry of Interiorsecurity force.
It was left to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), therefore, tofill the empty political space. There was no credible alternative representingthe old order.
But, as it turned out, the prestige enjoyed by the army did not last out theyear. Protests against military violence and arbitrary military trials grewincreasingly larger until the Muslim Brotherhood government finally took overin 2012.
Now this government, after only six months in power, faces the same stiffresistance to its rule as did the military.
Direct Action Prevails over Parliamentary Debates
Yet, the struggle continues at a high level in
By contrast, in
Nonetheless, despite its current problems, there was definitely a period of stabilization and broad acceptance of the initial transition in
In fact, the new Egyptian Parliamentary elections in 2011 were immediately metwith controversial charges of Muslim Brotherhood manipulation. The reputationof the newly elected parliament was further eroded after legislators failed toenact even one meaningful reform.
Even an increase in the minimum wage was enacted in 2011 by a court, not by parliament. And there are credible charges that the government has since actually obstructed its implementation.
As a result, millions have no confidence in the governing institutions reconstructed since Mubarak.
Unsolved Economic Tasks of the Revolution
Democratic and justice concerns of Egyptians are compounded by growing concernsfor the third demand of the Jan. 25, 2011 revolt – bread!
The economy has actually worsened since Mubarak fell. The Egyptian poundsuffered seven percent inflation since December, tourism is down some 20percent, petrol subsidies have been reduced and President Morsi very cautiouslyfloated in December possible sales tax hikes, food and commodity subsidyreductions and cuts in the number of state employees as a result ofInternational Monetary Fund loan stipulations.
Furthermore, according to
When I cited World Bank statistics claiming 40 percent of Egyptians live on twodollars a day, Mohammed, a thirty-two old
His friend, Mahmoud, is also a doctor and agreed. “It is worse now. The richare still rich but the poor are more poor. And, when John Kerry came to
Asked if people are getting tired from all the protests, Mohammed matter of factly responded that “we will not get tired because nothing has changed.”
Saber, the unemployed accountant, explained further: “We chose Morsi. Wethought his religion would make him more compassionate and he would listen tous. But now after six months, it is worse. So we come back to Tahrir to makeanother revolution.” And he very consciously added in response to my questionsabout the government, the military and the parliament that “we must do thisourselves.”
Thus, the voices heard in Tahrir and in protests throughout the countrydemanding genuine democracy, real social justice and significant economicimprovements hold more credibility among the majority of Egyptians than any ofthe institutions of power and it is this reality that keeps the rebelliongrowing.
But history also teaches us the hard lesson that state institutionsrepresenting old elite powers, no matter how unresponsive, can recover bydisguising their goals and by making compromises with sections of theiropposition whose economic interests are not so very different from their own.
Of course, this would mean once again that the majority of Egyptians would beleft out in the cold.
As an alternative, a new Egypt can arise when the youth, unemployed, women and working class, sharing similar economic objectives, unite nationally in a new, mass political force that combines electoral and direct action mobilizations challenging the power of the elite to finally establish a democratic, just and economically prosperous society benefiting the majority.
The future of this great country will be determined by which social force, thebottom or the top, actually succeeds in filling the political void that so farhas made
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